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Judicial Ethics: Political Activity
and Fund Raising
Marlene Arnold Nicholson *
ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 7
A Judge Should Refrain From Political Activity Inappropriate to
His Judicial Office
A. Political Conduct in General.
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office may
not act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization.
(2) A judge may not, except when a candidate for office or
retention, participate in political campaigns or activities, or make
political contributions.
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candi-
date either in a party primary or in a general election for a nonju-
dicial office.
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity
except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal sys-
tem, or the administration of justice.
B. Campaign Conduct.
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial
office filled by election or retention
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial
office;
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to
his direction or control from doing for him what he is prohibited
from doing under this canon; and except to the extent authorized
under subsection B(2) he should not allow any other person to do
for him what he is prohibited from doing under this canon; and
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues;
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or
other fact; provided, however, that he may announce his views
on measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the adminis-
tration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on his
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capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before
him.
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial
office filled by election or retention should not himself solicit
campaign funds, but he may establish committees of responsible
persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his
campaign. A candidate's committees may solicit funds for his
campaign not earlier than 90 days before the filing of nominating
petitions or an official declaration of intention to be retained in a
judicial office but no later than 90 days after the last election in
which he participates during the election year.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges are unlike other office holders in that they are not elected
to represent a constituency.2 Rather, a judge's task is to follow and
interpret the law in an impartial manner. The political realities of
judicial elections to some extent are at odds with the ideal of a
judiciary that can maintain the confidence of the public by func-
tioning, and appearing to function, in this independent manner. Il-
linois, like the many other states which that judges in popular
elections 3 has attempted to deal with this concern by placing re-
strictions upon the campaign activities of judicial candidates and
upon the political activities of judges who are not currently candi-
dates. The Illinois restrictions are found in Canon 7 of the Illinois
Code of Judicial Conduct (Illinois Code).4 Canon 7 of the Illinois
Code is divided into two parts. Part 7A deals generally with polit-
ical participation, including activities aiding other candidates or
political parties, and activities on behalf of the judge's own cam-
paign. Part 7B primarily addresses the activities of the judicial
candidate's own campaign. This Article analyzes these two parts
separately.
II. "POLITICAL CONDUCT IN GENERAL"
Canon 7A(l) of the Illinois Code prohibits judges or judicial
1. ILLINOIS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
67 (1989) [hereinafter ILLINOIS CODE]. The eight canons of the Illinois Code are set
forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rules 61 through 68. See id. ch. 1 10A, paras. 61-68.
2. See S. MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION RE-
FORMS 6 (1990).
3. Four-fifths of the states in this country select or retain some or all of their judges
through popular elections. Preface to P. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW
AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS at xiii (1990).
4. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7.
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candidates from holding an office in a political organization.5 It
also prohibits judges from "acting as a leader" in a political organi-
zation. Canon 7A(2) prohibits political contributions and partici-
pation "in political campaigns or activities."6 However, subsection
A(2), unlike subsection A(1), explicitly exempts candidates from
its restrictions.7 The unresolved question of when one becomes a
candidate will be considered in Section VI of this Article.'
The prohibition against being an officer (which is applicable to
both judges and judicial candidates) in subsection A(1), 9 and the
ban on contributing (which is applicable only to non-candidate
judges) in subsection A(2), 10 need little interpretation. However,
subsection A(l), which prohibits a "judge or a candidate for elec-
tion to judicial office" from acting "as a leader,"" and the prohibi-
tion in subsection A(2) on "participation" by non-candidate judges
"in political campaigns or activities,"' 12 are less definite. Canon
7A(4), which prohibits judges from engaging in "other political ac-
tivity," is equally unclear. 13 In analyzing these three subsections of
Canon 7, I will discuss separately the prohibitions applicable to
judicial candidates and those applicable to judges who are not
candidates.
A. Prohibitions on "General Political Conduct" Applicable to
Judges Who Are Not Candidates
Unfortunately, there is little case law in Illinois that helps to
establish the boundaries of proper political participation by non-
candidate judges. Even cases from other jurisdictions are usually
not very helpful, in part because these cases involve canons which
contain more explicit prohibitions than Canon 7 of the Illinois
Code. Also, most of the cases involve such blatant and numerous
political activities by judges that there could be little argument that
the prohibitions should be applicable.
One Illinois case which addresses improper political activity by a
non-candidate judge is In re Quindry."4 In Quindry, the Illinois
5. Id. Canon 7A(1).
6. Id. Canon 7A(2).
7. Id. Canon 7.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 135-55.
9. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7A(1).
10. Id. Canon 7A(2).
11. Id. Canon 7A(l).
12. Id. Canon 7A(2).
13. Id. Canon 7A(4).
14. 1 I1l. Cts. Comm'n 24 (1974) (judge's removal from bench was based on both
proven political violations referred to in the opinion and other, non-political violations).
1991]
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Courts Commission found clear and convincing evidence that the
judge had engaged in partisan politics by influencing the with-
drawal of a candidate from a primary election and by soliciting a
signature on a letter which was later used in a political advertise-
ment for another candidate.1 5 The judge was also found to have
changed absentee ballots to assure the victory of a particular candi-
date.' 6 However, the Commission found insufficient evidence to
support charges that the judge had selected school board candi-
dates, attended a political meeting, or made a speech urging the
election of a candidate. 7 Presumably, all of the activities charged
were thought by the Judicial Inquiry Board to violate either the
bans on serving as a "party leader" or taking "part in political
campaigns," activities which were prohibited under former Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 70,18 the predecessor to Canon 7. Appar-
ently, the Judicial Inquiry Board believed that even attendance at a
political campaign meeting should be considered taking "part in" a
political campaign. It seems likely that the Inquiry Board would
interpret the current prohibition on participation in "political cam-
paigns or activities" in the same manner. Of course, it is not clear
that the Illinois Courts Commission would have shared the Judi-
cial Inquiry Board's interpretation had sufficient evidence to sup-
port the charge of attendance at a campaign meeting been found.
The issue of the boundaries of political participation by non-can-
didate judges is addressed in In re Pincham,9 a case filed in 1988
by the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board. In Pincham, the complaint
alleged that the judge had made a speech at a political gathering in
support of the candidacy of the late Mayor Harold Washington.
Later, Judge Pincham resigned from the bench to become a candi-
date for a non-judicial office; at present, there has been no final
disposition of the complaint. 20 The Pincham case raises the issue
of whether judges who are not candidates for office may attend
15. Id. at 26-27.
16. Id. at 25-26.
17. Id. at 26-27.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 70 (1985) (repealed 1987); see also supra text
accompanying note 1 for the current version of this provision.
19. No. 88 CC 1 (I11. Cts. Comm'n 1988). Judge Pincham sued the Courts Commis-
sion for violating his rights of free speech, equal protection, and due process. The action
was dismissed based on the abstention doctrine. Pincham v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd.,
681 F. Supp. 1309, 1325 (N.D. I11.), aff'd, 872 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 975 (1989).
20. Disciplinary actions against judges in Illinois are considered moot once the judge
has left the bench. In re Dempsey, 2 I11. Cts. Comm'n 100, 105 (1987). Therefore, pre-
sumably, the case against Pincham will be dismissed.
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political gatherings, make speeches on behalf of other candidates,
and publicly endorse political candidates. Although Canon 7 of
the Illinois Code does not refer to endorsements of other candi-
dates or speeches on their behalf, such conduct would presumably
be considered "participation" in a political campaign, an activity
which non-candidate judges are prohibited from doing under Ca-
non 7A(l).2' Arguably, even a judge's attendance at such a gather-
ing would fall within the prohibition.
If one focuses on the plain meaning of the words used in Canon
7A(1), attendance at political meetings, endorsements of candi-
dates, and speeches made on behalf of candidates could be consid-
ered participation "in political campaigns or activities," in
violation of the canon. Also, all of these activities could implicate
the policy concern for maintaining a judiciary free from political
influence. However, endorsements and speeches by judges on be-
half of other candidates seem to present a more serious risk than
attendance at political meetings, due to a greater likelihood of quid
pro quo arrangements or feelings of obligation.
The American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct (Model Code) specifically prohibits non-candidate judges
from attending political meetings and making public endorsements
and speeches.22 Although the Model Code's prohibitions lend sup-
port to the assumption that such activities should be considered
improper, one may nevertheless infer that by failing to follow the
very explicit provision of the Model Code, the drafters of Illinois
Canon 7 intended to allow all of these activities, contrary to what
would seem to be the plain meaning of the word "participate." On
the other hand, if the intention of the Illinois drafters had been to
permit such activities, that intention could have been made clear in
Canon 7. Indeed, some states specifically provide that all judges
are permitted to engage in certain specified activities.23 Further-
more, if activities such as endorsements and speeches are not cov-
ered, there would seem to be little conduct left to come within the
ban on political participation by non-candidate judges that would
not also fall within the ban on being a political "leader. ' 24 More
21. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7A(l).
22. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(1)(a), (d) (1990) [hereinafter
1990 MODEL CODE].
23. See, e.g., MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(1)(a), (b) (West
1991) (permitting all judges to attend political meetings, make speeches on behalf of judi-
cial candidates, and contribute to political parties).
24. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note I, Canon 7A(1) (prohibition on being a leader applies
to candidate and non-candidate judges).
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significantly, at least with respect to endorsements and speeches,
the important policy concern of maintaining an independent judici-
ary free from political influence requires an interpretation that
would ban such activities by non-candidate judges.
Some light may be shed on the meaning of the general term
"participation" in the Illinois Code by looking at cases in other
jurisdictions which have applied general prohibitions to various
political activities. The question of whether attendance at political
events is improper when not explicitly prohibited was at issue in
cases in Missouri and Massachusetts. In the Missouri case, a
judge's attendance at the monthly meetings of a partisan political
club was found to violate a general rule against "engaging 'in parti-
san activities.' "25
On the other hand, in the Massachusetts case, a judge who was
present at breakfast campaign planning meetings for a gubernato-
rial candidate was found not to have taken an "active" part in par-
tisan politics. The meetings took place in the judge's home under
the auspices of his wife who was working on the campaign.26 The
court did find that the judge had engaged in other political activi-
ties which were less innocuous than being present at his wife's
meetings. For instance, the judge had arranged and attended other
political meetings; the court found this conduct to be detrimental
to "the public image of the courts. ' 27 Nevertheless, the court re-
fused to discipline the judge for these activities because the rules
applicable at the time of the alleged offenses did not give sufficient
notice that this conduct was prohibited. 28  Although the standard
of judicial conduct in effect in Massachusetts at the time of the
alleged infractions was even less explicit than the comparable Illi-
nois canon,29 the case does suggest that the failure specifically to
25. In re Coming, 538 S.W.2d 46, 53 (Mo. 1976). The judge was also found to have
violated the rule against making political contributions and to have engaged in other
improper non-political activities. Id. at 50.
26. In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 66, 306 N.E.2d 203, 232 (1973).
27. Id. at 67, 306 N.E.2d at 232.
28. The court stated that "judges, like other citizens, are entitled to fair treatment.
This includes fair warning of what is permitted and what is forbidden." Id.
29. At the time of the alleged violations in Troy, Massachusetts had not yet adopted
its own code of judicial conduct. However, the court previously had applied the ABA
Canons of Judicial Ethics (a predecessor to the Model Code), which " 'merely put into
writing what had been accepted earlier.' " Id. at 65, 306 N.E.2d at 232 (quoting In re
DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. 787, 809, 279 N.E.2d 296, 308 (1972)). Rather than cite the canon
that broadly prohibited "partisan activities," however, the court quoted a more specific
provision, which stated that "'suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a
judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party as against
another.'" Id. (quoting CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1950)). Apparently,
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define prohibited activities might cause a court to interpret Canon
7 of the Illinois Code narrowly and thus find attendance at political
gatherings to be permitted.
A broad range of political activities has been found to violate
bans on political participation in jurisdictions outside Illinois.
These include driving a van with political posters while delivering
campaign material on election day,3" inducing a candidate to with-
draw from a contested primary while supporting another candi-
date,3' developing campaign strategies and campaign issues, and
privately soliciting support for candidates from members of the
bar.32
B. Prohibitions on "General Political Activities"
of Judicial Candidates
Under Canon 7 of the Illinois Code, judicial candidates have
more freedom to engage in political activities than judges who are
not candidates. Candidates are exempted from the specific prohibi-
tion on judges giving political contributions.33 Also, the general
the court in Troy found this admonition to be too vague to be the basis for discipline on
charges of attending and arranging political meetings. Id.
After the alleged violations in Troy, Massachusetts adopted its own code of judicial
conduct, which specifically prohibited attendance at political events. See MASSACHU-
SETTS CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (1973). The Troy court stressed, however,
that the higher standards incorporated in the new code would apply only to future con-
duct. Troy, 364 Mass. at 64-65, 306 N.E.2d at 231-32 (citing DeSaulnier, 360 Mass. at
810, 279 N.E.2d at 309).
30. In re Bayles, 427 Mich. 1201, 399 N.W.2d 394 (1986). The opinion described the
signs as bumper stickers; however, the Decision and Recommendation for Order of Disci-
pline of the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission described the signs as "posters." In re
Bayles, No. 33 (Mich. Jud. Tenure Comm'n Sept. 2, 1986). Michigan specifically prohib-
its judges from public endorsement of candidates for non-judicial office. MICHIGAN
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(l)(b) (West 1991). Presumably driving a car
with political posters was considered an "endorsement."
31. In re Bayles, No. 33 (Mich. Jud. Tenure Comm'n Sept. 2, 1986). The Commis-
sion did not explain what provision of the canon this conduct violated. The Michigan
Code does not include a general prohibition on "participation" or "acting as a leader."
See MICHIGAN CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7 (West 1991). Michigan does pro-
hibit holding an office in a political party and making a speech on behalf of a non-judicial
candidate, but permits attendance at political gatherings, speeches on behalf of the candi-
date's or other person's judicial candidacies, and contributions to a political party. Id.
Canon 7A(l)(a), (b).
32. In re Defoor, 494 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 1986). The Florida canon applicable to
non-candidate judges includes prohibitions on acting as a leader in a political organiza-
tion, publicly endorsing or making a speech for a political candidate, or organization and
engaging "in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law,
the legal system or the administration of justice." FLORIDA CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Canon 7A(4) (1983).
33. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7A. The Model Code is somewhat ambigu-
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ban on political participation found in Canon 7A(1) of the Illinois
Code includes an explicit exception for judges who are candidates
for judicial office.34 Because the term "participate" is so general,
the precise scope of activities in which judicial candidates may en-
gage is not clear. Furthermore, under Canon 7A(l), even a candi-
date may not act as a "leader or hold any office in a political
organization."' a3 Therefore, judicial candidates may find it difficult
to determine where to draw the line between permitted participa-
tion in political activities under Canon 7A(2), 36 and acting as a
"leader," which is prohibited even to candidates under Canon
7A(1). 37
The fact that the Illinois Code has not included some of the
Model Code's specific bans on the political activities of judicial
candidates implies that the Illinois drafters may have considered
these activities appropriate. For instance, unlike the Model Code,
Illinois does not expressly prohibit assessments to political parties
or organizations 3 and most endorsements of political candidates. 39
Although this deletion may signify that the drafters of Canon 7 of
ous as to whether judicial candidates can contribute to other candidates. Canon 5 per-
mits judicial candidates to contribute to "political organizations." 1990 MODEL CODE,
supra note 22, Canon 5C(l)(a)(iii). Such an organization is defined as "a political party
or other group the principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of
candidates to political office." Id. terminology. This definition seems to exclude the cam-
paign committee of a single candidate, but might be interpreted to include a joint cam-
paign committee for more than one candidate. However, the view that contributions to
candidates are not authorized under the Model Code provision is reinforced by the fact
that the general prohibition on contributions by judges applies to "political organiza-
tion[s] or candidate[s]," id. Canon 5A(l)(e), while the exception for contributions from
judicial candidates applies only to contributions given to "political organizations," id.
Canon 5C(l)(a)(iii).
34. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7A(2).
35. Id. Canon 7A(l).
36. Id. Canon 7A(2).
37. Id. Canon 7A(l).
38. 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5A(l)(e).
39. The general prohibition on endorsement of candidates found in Model Code Ca-
non 5A(l)(b) is modified by permitting judicial candidates to endorse some other judicial
candidates. Id. Canon 5C(l)(b)(iv). Canon 5 permits the public endorsement of or pub-
lic opposition to "candidates for the same judicial office in a public election in which the
judge or judicial candidate is running." Id. Prior to the 1990 amendments, judicial can-
didates were prohibited from endorsing other candidates. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7A(l)(b) (1972) [hereinafter 1972 MODEL CODE]. The 1990 Model Code also
makes clear that a candidate may appear in campaign materials and other "promotions of
the ticket" along with other candidates, 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C(3),
thus, apparently, resolving in the negative the question of whether joint campaign materi-
als should be considered endorsements by all the candidates participating. Courts in
some jurisdictions have found joint campaign activities to be endorsements. See J. SHA-
MAN, S. LUBET & D. ALFINI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 11.07, at 328-29
(1990) [hereinafter J. SHAMAN].
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the Illinois Code meant to permit these activities, one could re-
spond that if that had been their intention, they could specifically
have provided that those activities were permissible, as they did
with respect to contributions.40 It should also be kept in mind that
such conduct could, under some circumstances, raise issues under
Canon 2, which provides that an Illinois judge should "conduct
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."4 Indeed, even ac-
tivities explicitly permitted under the Illinois Code, such as making
political contributions, could in some situations implicate the
broad concerns of Canon 2.42
The result in a recent case suggests that the Illinois Courts Com-
mission will interpret the restrictions on judicial candidates to pro-
vide a good deal of leeway for some forms of political activity. In
In re Tully,43 the Commission found that the Illinois Code does not
prohibit expressions of support by judicial candidates for non-judi-
cial candidates."
III. CAMPAIGN CONDUCT
A. Political Expression
1. Discussion of Legal or Political Issues
Under Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Illinois Code, a judicial candidate
is specifically permitted to "announce his views on measures to im-
prove the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice, if
in doing so he does not cast doubt on his capacity to decide impar-
tially any issue that may come before him."'45 Judicial candidates
are expressly subject to other restrictions which presumably would
be implicitly required of all judges.46 Under Canon 7B(l)(c), a ju-
40. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7A(2).
41. Id. Canon 2A.
42. Id. Canon 2. See generally Shaman, The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Appearance of Impropriety, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 581 (1991).
43. No. 90 CC 2 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
44. Id. slip op. at 8.
45. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(l)(c).
46. Presumably, the restriction in Canon 7A(4) which prohibits judges from engaging
"in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice," would be interpreted to include, at least, the
same restrictions applicable to judicial candidates in Canon 7B(l)(c). But see infra text
accompanying notes 61-92 for a discussion of recent cases casting doubt on the constitu-
tionality of the limitations on campaign speech by judicial candidates. Similar first
amendment arguments might be asserted with respect to the restrictions on the political
speech of judges who are not candidates. However, in the recent cases overturning, on
first amendment grounds, restrictions on the political speech of judicial candidates, the
1991]
Loyola University Law Journal
dicial candidate may not comment upon a subject that would "cast
doubt on the candidate's capacity to decide impartially any issue
that may come before him."47 Furthermore, the same canon bars
making "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful performance of the duties of the office." Finally, the judi-
cial candidate may not announce "his views on disputed legal or
political issues."48 Drawing the line between the permissible dis-
cussion of "measures to improve the law" on the one hand, and the
impermissible discussion of "disputed legal or political issues" or
even "pledges or promises of conduct in office" on the other, is no
easy task. Indeed, in In re Buckley,49 the Illinois Courts Commis-
sion recently interpreted the words "pledges or promises of con-
duct in office" to include a judge's statement that he had "never
written an opinion reversing a rape conviction."5 Although the
violation was found to be "insubstantial, insignificant" and thus
not warranting even a reprimand, 51 the Commission asserted that
the statements suggested that "a higher standard must be met by a
defendant charged and convicted of rape whose case is argued
before the respondent on review. "52 The Commission relied on a
Washington Supreme Court decision involving an incumbent judge
who was censured for stating that he was "tough on drunk driv-
ing. ' 53 The Washington court had stressed that the statements
"single out a special class of defendants [to be] held to a higher
standard." 54
In other jurisdictions violations have been found even when the
campaign statements did not relate to a particular type of defend-
courts have stressed the interest of voters in having information to make informed
choices. See infra id. This concern would not be relevant in cases involving judges who
were not political candidates.
47. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(1)(c).
48. Id.
49. No. 91 CC I (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
50. Id. slip op. at 4. Justice Buckley has filed a complaint in federal court against the
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board and the Illinois Courts Commission asking that Canon
7B(1)(C) be declared unconstitutional on its face or as applied to him, and that the Com-
mission vacate its order and expunge the finding of a violation of the Illinois Code. Com-
plaint for Injunctive Relief, Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., No. 91 C 7635 (N.D.
Ill. filed Nov. 27, 1991). See the discussion of constitutional issues infra text accompany-
ing notes 61-92.
51. Buckley, No. 91 CC 1, slip op. at 5 (Il. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
52. Id. at 4.
53. In re Kaiser, 111 Wash. 2d 275, 280, 759 P.2d 392, 395-96 (1988), cited in Buck-
ley, No. 91 CC 1, slip op. at 4 (111. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991); see also J. SHAMAN, supra
note 39, § 11.09, at 330-35.
54. Kaiser, I 11 Wash. 2d at 280, 759 P.2d at 396, quoted in Buckley, No. 91 CC 1,
slip op. at 4 (Il1. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
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ant. For instance, in Kentucky, a candidate was disciplined for
stating that he had a "solid reputation for law and order" and did
"not allow plea bargaining, ' 55 while in Michigan, the slogan "a
strict sentencing philosophy" was found to be improper.5 6
However, it appears that in Illinois, the Judicial Inquiry Board
and the Courts Commission may not be interpreting Canon 7 to
prohibit such general statements. In In re Tully, the Commission
found that statements to the effect that the candidate was "tough
on crime" and "tough on taxes" were neither "pledges or promises
of conduct in office" nor "statements on disputed legal or political
issues."' 57 Rather, they were described as lying "within the realm
of general comment" permissible under the Illinois Code.5"
Candidates have been disciplined in some jurisdictions for com-
menting on specific cases in which they had been involved. 9 It
appears that the Illinois Courts Commission and the Judicial In-
quiry Board are not now interpreting Canon 7 to cover such com-
ments. In Tully, several statements about specific cases were not
found to have violated the Illinois Code. 6°
55. See J. SHAMAN, supra note 39, § 11.09, at 330 (discussing In re Nolan (Ky. Judi-
cial Ethics Comm'n 1984)).
56. State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. C-219
(1980); see also J. SHAMAN, supra note 39, § 11.09, at 330.
57. In re Tully, No. 90 CC 2, slip op. at 6 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
58. Id. at 7. The Commission also found that the complaint of the Judicial Inquiry
Board did not allege that these comments fell within the realm of impermissible "pledges
or promises" or "comments about disputed legal or political issues." Id. Similar general
comments in Buckley were found not to violate the prohibition on "pledges or promises."
Buckley, No. 91 CC 1, slip op. at 3 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991). The comments
included the following: "Our Toughest Anti-Crime Team"; "FOR THE VICTIMS OF
CRIME"; "the strongest anti-crime team we can elect"; "I'll deliver justice with an even
hand, making public safety one of my top concerns-never forgetting the victims of
crime"; and "Help win the war against crime and drugs." Id. at 2.
59. See J. SHAMAN, supra note 39, § 11.09, at 332. However, judges have been per-
mitted to discuss court procedures and "the law governing a judge's duty in particular
situations." Id. Also, at least one jurisdiction would find a violation only if the com-
ments related to a matter presently before the court. Id.
60. The following advertisements allegedly were approved by the candidate and were
not found to violate the Canon:
"I went to a disabled Sr. Citizen's home to sign arrest warrants against two
home invaders .... The detective on the scene said 'without Judge Tully going
to see the woman, we wouldn't have made an arrest.'"
. . . "I saved Cook County Taxpayers $2.5 Million in 1989 in decision [sic]
involving the CTA."
. . . "In a recent ruling the Illinois Appellate Court upheld Judge Tully's
ruling that resulted in saving the tax payers [sic] of Cook County $2,500,000 in
1989 and a fare increase for CTA users."
Tully, No. 90 CC 2, slip op. at 2-3 (Il. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991) (quoting various
newspaper advertisements). In Buckley, no violation was found based on the statement
Loyola University Law Journal
This narrow interpretation of the provisions applicable in Tully
may well have been influenced by a spate of recent cases that have
cast serious doubt on the constitutionally of broad prohibitions on
the campaign expression of judicial candidates. In J.C.J.D. v.
R.J. C.R.,61 the Kentucky Supreme Court found that the prohibi-
tion on discussion of "all 'disputed legal or political issues' " vio-
lated the first amendment.62 Although the court found a
compelling state interest in assuring that judges act objectively and
give the appearance of objectivity, the bans were not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to satisfy the requirements of the first amend-
ment.63 In J.C.J.D., the court commented that bans on misleading
statements or comments on cases likely to come before the courts
would be constitutional. However, the restriction at issue was not
limited to such expression. Instead, it prohibited all speech
"[o]ther than allowing a judicial candidate to state a professional
history, and promise faithful and impartial performance of duties if
elected." 6
In J. C.J.D., the court stressed that if judges are to be chosen by
popular elections, voters should be able to obtain sufficient infor-
mation to make an informed choice. In recent federal district
court cases, the same prohibitions were found to be unconstitu-
tional, applying nearly identical reasoning to that of the Kentucky
Supreme Court in J. C.J.D. In American Civil Liberties Union v.
Florida Bar,66 decided shortly before J.C.JD., the court com-
mented that "when a state decides thai its trial judges are to be
popularly elected . . . it must recognize the candidates' right to
make campaign speeches and the concomitant right of the public
to be informed about the judicial candidates. '67
In a Pennsylvania federal district court case decided after
that the candidate had " '[r]einstated the conviction of a major drug dealer.'" Buckley,
No. 91 CC 1, slip op. at 2 (I11. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991) (quoting campaign
advertisement).
61. 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991).
62. Id. at 956 (emphasis in original); see also Clark v. Burleigh, 228 Cal. App. 3d
1369, 1389, 279 Cal. Rptr. 333, 346 (limiting candidate's statements to state-supplied
pamphlets setting forth his or her qualifications and background is a prior restraint on
expression in violation of the first amendment), reh'g granted, 283 Cal. Rptr. 381, 812
P.2d 562 (Cal. 1991).
63. J.CJ.D., 803 S.W.2d at 956.
64. Id.
65. Such information would include "knowledge of the law, and personal views and
beliefs." Id. The court described the judge's expression as criticism "of the Code and
published court decisions." Id. at 957.
66. 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
67. Id. at 1097 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 22
Judicial Ethics
J.CJ.D., Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court,68 the
court concluded that "[t]here was an array of less restrictive means
to preserve the fact and appearance of judicial impartiality. ' 69 The
courts in J. CJ.D. and Stretton seemed to be influenced by the fact
that the Model Code had just been modified to loosen the strictures
on political expression by judicial candidates.70 The revised Model
Code provision has deleted the ban on announcing views on "dis-
puted legal or political issues.'"' Instead, it prohibits "statements
that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to
cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court.
'7 2
Although Stretton eventually was overruled by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals,73 the appellate decision upheld the constitution-
ality of the applicable canon only by accepting the narrow interpre-
tation proffered by the Pennsylvania Judicial Inquiry and Review
Board. In accordance with the rule that "'every reasonable con-
struction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from un-
constitutionality,' "I' the Third Circuit interpreted the words
"disputed legal or political issues" to refer to "those issues that are
likely to come before the court, ' 75 thereby satisfying the require-
ment that the restriction on speech be "narrowly tailored to serve
the state's compelling interest in an impartial judiciary. "76 Thus
narrowed, the canon is virtually identical to the Model Code provi-
sion as revised in 1990.17
Even the narrowed restriction on matters "likely to come before
the court" arguably would be subject to first amendment challenge;
however, such a restriction would probably be upheld. In a recent
case, a federal district court in Kentucky had "no difficulty finding
68. 763 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991). In Stretton, the
judicial candidate wanted to criticize a recent Supreme Court opinion that found a co-
erced confession to be harmless error. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 131-32.
69. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 137; accord Beshar v. Butt, 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D.
Ark. 1991). The court in Stretton also found the prohibition to be unconstitutionally
vague. Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 139.
70. JC.J.D., 803 S.W.2d at 956; Stretton, 763 F. Supp. at 139.
71. 1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 39, Canon 7B(l)(c).
72. 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Cannon 5A(3)(d)(ii). The court in J.C.J.D
explained that the change was made because the revision committee believed the previous
Model Code provision to be "overly broad." J.CJ.D., 803 S.W.2d at 956-57.
73. Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d 137 (3rd Cir. 1991).
74. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun-
cil, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S 648, 657 (1895)),
quoted in Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144.
75. Stretton, 944 F.2d. at 144.
76. Id.
77. 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii).
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a compelling state interest in an impartial judiciary," ' and thus
upheld a restriction on "pledges and promises of conduct in office
and commitments with respect to [legal] issues likely to come
before the court." 9 The court acknowledged that a candidate
might have difficulty determining which issues would be likely to
come before him, but nevertheless rejected a vagueness challenge
and found the constraint necessary to the impartiality of the judi-
cial system. 80 However, the same court found that the restriction
was unconstitutional as applied to administrative issues likely to
come before the court.8'
If the broad prohibition in Canon 7 of the Illinois Code on com-
ments relating to "disputed legal or political issues" faces a consti-
tutional challenge, the courts probably will follow either Stretton
(and narrow the reach of the prohibitions) 2 or J. C.J.D. (and inval-
idate the restriction on its face).83 Indeed, two recent Illinois
Courts Commission cases seem to have strained in order to avoid
raising first amendment challenges.
In In re Tully, the Commission avoided a constitutional chal-
lenge to the prohibitions on "pledges or promises of conduct in
office" and pronouncements on "disputed legal or political issues"
by finding that the statements made by the candidate were not
within those categories of expression, and that in any event, the
complaint of the Judicial Inquiry Board did not allege a violation
of those prohibitions.84 The statements made included general
comments such as "tough on crime" and "tough on taxes, "85 as
well as comments on specific cases the candidate had decided in
the past.8 6
The Commission's narrow interpretation of Canon 7 and the
complaint in Tully may well have avoided serious constitutional
challenges. On the other hand, in In re Buckley, the Commission
seemingly attempted to avoid a constitutional challenge by inter-
78. Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement and Removal Comm'n, 776 F. Supp.
309, 313 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
79. Id. at 315.
80. Id.
81. The court explained that "impartiality is an attribute of the exercise of a court's
adjudicatory power, not its administrative function." Id. at 314.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 68-81.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
84. In re Tully, No. 90 CC 2, slip op. at 6 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
85. Id.
86. See supra note 60.
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preting the same canon quite broadly. 8  It has become obvious
based on the recent cases in other jurisdictions discussed above
that the very general prohibition on commenting on legal or polit-
ical issues is more vulnerable to constitutional challenge than the
narrower prohibition on "pledges or promises of conduct in of-
fice."' 88 Perhaps that explains why the Commission chose to cate-
gorize the statement in Buckley that the candidate had "never
written an opinion reversing a rape conviction"89 as a "pledge or
promise." However, if the statement fits within either of the two
categories, it would seem to be the prohibition on commenting on
legal issues. Of course, that conclusion is reached primarily be-
cause the prohibition is so general as to include almost any state-
ment other than comments on the relative qualifications or
diligence of the candidates. 9° It is this very generality that raises
the constitutional problem.
It is not clear that the constitutional issue can be avoided in
Buckley by finding a violation of the more specific rather than the
more general prohibition. Traditional first amendment jurispru-
dence, which would require that a provision be interpreted nar-
rowly to avoid serious constitutional challenges, 9' may be violated
by the Commission's "implicit pledge" theory. Furthermore, the
Commission's conclusion that the statement was "tantamount to
an implicit pledge that rape convicti6ns on review have been and
will continue to be treated summarily" 92 seems to stray rather far
from an obvious interpretation of the language used. Such a broad
application of the "pledges or promises" prohibition may not be
necessary to further the compelling interest in an impartial judici-
ary. Also, the possibility of other similar broad and unpredictable
interpretations of Canon 7 raise the specter of a "chilling" effect on
protected political speech.
87. Justice Buckley has, however, challenged the Commission's holding on first
amendment grounds. See supra note 50.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 61-82.
89. In re Buckley, No. 91 CC 1, slip. op. at 2 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
90. Indeed, the prohibition has been interpreted that broadly. One expert has
explained:
Advisory committees have been careful to point out that restrictions on cam-
paign speech are not intended to limit the judicial candidate solely to promises
of faithful performance of the duties of the judicial office. However, interpreta-
tions of Canon 7B(l) of the Code do appear to limit the candidate to discussion
of judicial system improvements and reforms the candidate wishes to imple-
ment, and truthful criticism of the qualifications of an opponent.
J. SHAMAN, supra note 39, § 11.09, at 333.
91. Frisby v. Schulz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988).
92. Buckley, No. 91 CC 1, slip op. at 4 (Il. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
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2. Misleading and False Campaign Expression
Canon 7B(l)(c) of the Illinois Code also prohibits judicial candi-
'dates from misrepresenting their "identity, qualifications, present
position, or other fact."9 3 Judges in a number of jurisdictions have
been disciplined for making false statements in their political cam-
paigns.94 However, a more difficult issue arises when representa-
tions are not actually false, but create a false impression when
taken out of context. The Illinois Courts Commission considered
this question in 1977, in In re Elward.95 In that case, a circuit
court judge was charged with publishing advertisements which
were "materially misleading." He had quoted only a "truncated
version" of a bar association evaluation, thereby giving a false im-
pression of support when the association had actually found the
candidate unqualified.96 However, because numerous newspaper
articles, editorials, and advertisements were published which had
clearly stated that the candidate had been found unqualified, the
Courts Commission found that "measured against this 'total mix'"
of information, the candidate's advertisement did not create a false
impression.97
Based on Elward, at least for issues of omission, the focus ap-
pears to be on the overall likelihood that voters will be misled,
rather than upon the intent of the candidate in publishing the rep-
resentation. Such an approach may make it difficult for a candi-
date to determine in advance whether an omission will be found to
violate Canon 7, because it frequently cannot be known whether
additional information will have been widely publicized. More im-
portantly, this focus is clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the
Illinois Code, which presumably is to assure that only persons of
the highest ethical standards serve in the judiciary. Using the El-
ward analysis, even if it were clear that a judicial candidate had
attempted to mislead the voters, no discipline would be adminis-
tered if the attempt were unsuccessful due to information supplied
to the public from other sources.
In In re Tully, the most recent Illinois case involving misleading
statements, the Courts Commission did not address the question of
the overall likelihood that voters would be misled. Instead, the
Commission focused solely on the tendency of the statements
93. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(l)(c).
94. See J. SHAMAN, supra note 39, § 11.10, at 335-36.
95. 1 Ill. Cts. Comm'n 114, 116-19 (1977).
96. Id. at 116.
97. Id. at 121.
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themselves to mislead. Judge Tully, a successful candidate for the
appellate court who was a sitting circuit court judge during the
campaign, was reprimanded for a misleading newspaper advertise-
ment that implied that he was an incumbent running for retention
on the appellate court.98 He was further reprimanded for state-
ments the Commission found even more misleading to the effect
that he had been endorsed and found highly qualified by lawyers'
organizations. 99
B. Fund Raising in Judicial Campaigns
Although Canon 7B(2) of the Illinois Code prohibits judges or
judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds, they
may "establish committees of responsible persons to secure and
manage the expenditure of funds."'" There are no prohibitions on
who may be solicited; however, the general requirement of Canon
2 that the judge should avoid the "appearance of impropriety"'' 0
may affect some solicitation decisions.
Ethical guidelines in New York and South Dakota prohibit con-
tributions by parties who have or are likely to have cases pending
before the judge. 0 2 However, South Dakota explicitly permits so-
licitation directed at attorneys, even those with cases pending
before the candidate, so long as "the solicitation makes no refer-
ence, direct or indirect, to any particular pending or potential liti-
gation."' 11 3 The rationale for distinguishing between parties and
98. The advertisement stated in large print the phrase "VOTE FOR * ** JOHN P. *
* * TULLY * * * APPELLATE COURT JUDGE." In re Tully, No. 90 CC 2, slip op.
at 6 (Ill. Cts. Comm'n Oct. 25, 1991).
99. The candidate placed a newspaper advertisement which stated: "HIGHLY
QUALIFIED & ENDORSED" and "'HIGHLY QUALIFIED,' TRIAL LAWYERS
GROUP." Id. at 6-7.
100. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2). Canon 7 of the Illinois Code con-
tains no provision like the one in the Model Code that prohibits judicial candidates from
personally soliciting "publicly stated support." Compare id. Canon 7 with 1990 MODEL
CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C(2). Presumably, this activity is considered appropriate
in Illinois, subject to the general requirement of Canon 2 that judges must maintain the
appearance and reality of integrity and impartiality. See ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1,
Canon 2; see also Shaman, supra note 42.
The Supreme Court of Oregon recently upheld the constitutionality of that State's ban
on personal solicitation of campaign contributions by judicial candidates. In re Fadeley,
310 Or. 548, 548-49, 802 P.2d 31, 44 (1990).
101. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 2.
102. SOUTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) guidelines, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-9 app. (1982); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
103. SOUTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2) guidelines, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 12-9 app. (1982).
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attorneys is based on the determination that "lawyers may be bet-
ter able than laymen to appraise accurately the qualifications of
candidates for judicial office."' 4 On the other hand, New York's
ethical guidelines state that candidates should not accept contribu-
tions from attorneys who have cases pending in the candidate's
court. 10 5
Although there is no Illinois authority on the definition of "so-
licitation," other jurisdictions have considered this question. Ac-
cording to a Kentucky ethics opinion, the word "solicitation"
simply denotes asking for something.0 6 In another jurisdiction,
letters and newspaper advertisements inviting persons to fund rais-
ers were found to be solicitations. 10 7
Canon 7B(2) of the Illinois Code prohibits personal solicitation
of contributions by judicial candidates. 08 However, unlike Canon
5 of the Model Code"° and similar provisions in most other states,
Canon 7 of the Illinois Code does not prohibit personal acceptance
of contributions by the candidate. Indeed, the prohibition on ac-
ceptance of campaign contributions was deleted by a 1974 amend-
ment to former Illinois Supreme Court Rule 70, the predecessor of
Canon 7. The historical note to the 1974 amendment states that
the prohibition on receipt had placed "an unrealistic prohibition on
candidates for elective office .... It is the vice of personal solicita-
tion at which the rule is aimed." 110
Therefore, it is clear that the personal receipt by a judicial candi-
date of a contribution is not a per se violation of ethical canons in
Illinois; however, the circumstances of a particular contribution
could raise concerns under Canon 2 regarding the appearance of
impropriety."I' Contributions accepted under conditions that
would lead the contributor or others to believe that a quid pro quo
may be involved would be an obvious example. There is no explicit
prohibition either in Canon 7 or in the Illinois Election Code re-
garding the receipt of contributions in cash; however, the accept-
ance by judicial candidates of cash contributions might cause
bystanders to question the transaction.
Any receipt of contributions by the candidate or the campaign
104. Id.
105. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 289 (1973).
106. Ky. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. JE-42 (1983).
107. La. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Ops. 11, 13 (1973).
108. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2).
109. 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C(l).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 70 (1970) (amended 1974) (repealed 1987).
111. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 2.
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committee should be handled in such a manner that compliance
with the reporting and disclosure requirements of the Illinois Elec-
tion Code will be assured. The Election Code requires that:
Every person who receives a contribution in excess of $20 for a
political committee shall, on demand of the treasurer, and in any
event within 5 days after receipt of such contribution, render to
the treasurer a detailed account thereof, including the amount,
the name and address of the person making such contribution,
and the date on which it was received.' 12
Furthermore, the donors of all contributions of $150 or more must
be listed in the campaign committee's disclosure reports." 3
Thus, contributions received in cash might make compliance
with these laws difficult. Also, the acceptance of two or more con-
tributions from different persons which are "bundled" and given
by one person would be improper unless the relevant information
regarding the actual sources of all the funds given in excess of $20
were provided." 4 Furthermore, another provision of the Illinois
Election Code prohibits any anonymous contribution or contribu-
tion "made in the name of another.""' 5 These statutes cast doubt
on campaign fund raising practices such as "passing the hat" at
political meetings.
Clearly, judicial candidates who wish to be involved in the fund-
ing of their campaigns should be familiar with the laws regulating
campaign financing in Illinois, in addition to the rules of Canon 7,
in order to assure that they comply with the admonition of Canon
2 that judges should "respect and comply with the law. '""l 6
IV. RECUSAL OR NOTIFICATION OF OPPOSING COUNSEL
WHEN CAMPAIGN SUPPORTERS APPEAR IN THE
CANDIDATE'S COURT
Judges sometimes face the dilemma of whether or not they must
recuse themselves or at least inform the opposing counsel when a
campaign supporter appears in court. Neither the Illinois Code
nor the Model Code directly addresses this question. However, in
a recent Illinois appellate court case, Gluth Brothers Construction,
Inc. v. Union National Bank,"7 the court held that a judge need
112. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 9-6 (1989).
113. Id. para. 9-11.
114. Id. para. 9-6.
115. Id. para. 9-26. Contributions made in violation of this statute escheat to the
State. Id.
116. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 2A.
117. 192 Ill. App. 3d 649, 548 N.E.2d 1364 (2d Dist. 1989).
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not inform opposing counsel that the plaintiff's attorney had
served as an officer of the judge's 1976 campaign.""8 The opinion
stressed that the campaign had been nearly six years before the
complaint in the case had been filed and that there was no evidence
of an ongoing relationship between the attorney and the judge.119
According to a 1984 Illinois State Bar Association advisory
opinion, public endorsement by an attorney of a judicial candidate
should not result in per se disqualification of the judge when the
attorney later appears before him.120 This conclusion has also been
reached in several other jurisdictions. 121 However, an advisory
opinion from Alabama stressed that the circumstances of the par-
ticular case should be considered carefully by the judge before de-
termining whether recusal is necessary. 122 The same 1984 Illinois
advisory opinion determined that receipt of a campaign contribu-
tion by a judge from an attorney appearing before him does not in
and of itself require recusal. 123 This rule is consistent with cases in
other jurisdictions. 124  In other cases, notification of opposing
counsel that a contribution had been made was determined to be
unnecessary. 25
V. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF SPOUSES AND
OTHER CLOSE RELATIVES
Canon 7 of the Illinois Code does not directly refer to the polit-
ical activities of relatives. The most reasonable interpretation of
this provision leads to the conclusion that no restrictions were
meant to be placed on truly independent political activity of family
members.
Canon 7B(1)(b) of the Illinois Code does provide, however, that
the candidate "should not allow any other person to do for him
what he is prohibited from doing under this canon,"'126 yet even
this prohibition provides an exception for the activities of the can-
118. Id. at 654-56, 548 N.E.2d at 1367-69.
119. Id.
120. Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 866 (1984).
121. See, e.g., Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm., Op. 84-213; Fla. Comm. on Standards of
Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 78-7.
122. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm., Op. 84-213.
123. Ill. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 866 (1984).
124. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm., Ops. 84-213, -227; Fla. Comm. on Standards of
Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 78-7; N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Eth-
ics, Op. 511 (1979).
125. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm., Op. 84-227; Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct
Governing Judges, Op. 78-7.
126. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(1)(b).
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didate's campaign committee. Canon 7 may, therefore, be inter-
preted to permit anyone, other than the candidate, to solicit
campaign contributions for the candidate, if he or she is acting
through a campaign committee. This interpretation is reinforced
by the Illinois drafters' omission from Canon 7 of language con-
tained in the 1972 Model Code, which stated that a judicial candi-
date "should encourage members of [her] family to adhere to the
same standards of political conduct that apply to [her]."'127
It is therefore reasonable to interpret Canon 7 of the Illinois
Code to permit close relatives to serve on campaign committees
and to solicit contributions for the candidate. However, if contrib-
utors perceive the family member as a mere surrogate for the can-
didate, questions might be raised under the more general
provisions of Canon 2, which require judges to promote public
confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary.12 8
Under Canon 7 of the Illinois Code, spouses of judges or judicial
candidates are not subject to any restraints with regard to their
independent political activity on behalf of unrelated candidates or
political organizations. 129 The only problem in this context arises
when there is a suspicion that the activity is not truly an independ-
ent act of the judge's spouse, but rather a surrogate act for the
judge or judicial candidate. No reported Illinois cases deal with
this issue. In the few cases decided in other jurisdictions, the
courts have been reluctant to attribute the political activity of a
spouse to the judge and have stressed that " 'the autonomy of the
judge's spouse should simply be accepted as an understood premise
of modem life.' ,130
127. 1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 39, Canon 7B(1)(a). The Model Code now pro-
vides that a judicial candidate shall "encourage members of the candidate's family to
adhere to the same standards of political conduct in support of the candidate as apply to
the candidate." 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5A(3). The Canon was re-
vised from the 1972 version, which did not include the reference to the judge's own cam-
paign. 1972 MODEL CODE, supra note 39, Canon 7B(l)(a). The purpose of the change
was to make clear that the limitations on political participation of family members were
meant to apply only to the judicial candidate's campaign. Note to MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 69 (Discussion Draft 1989) (submitted for consideration at the 1990
Annual Meeting of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association).
128. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 2A.
129. The corresponding Model Code provision also permits the judge or judicial can-
didate's family to engage in unlimited political activity. 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note
22, Canon 5A(3) commentary. However, unlike the Illinois provision, Model Code Ca-
non 5A(3) limits activity of relatives in the judicial candidate's campaign. Id.
130. In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 196-97, 351 A.2d 740, 746 (1976) (quoting Professor
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., special consultant and draftsman for the ABA Special Commit-
tee on Standards of Judicial Ethics); accord In re Troy, 364 Mass. 15, 64-66, 306 N.E.2d
203, 231-32 (1973).
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However, in In re Briggs, which specifically dealt with a contri-
bution made by the spouse of a judge, the Missouri Supreme Court
accepted the finding of its discipline commission that the contribu-
tion was not an "independent act" of the wife.' 3 ' Although the
court was not explicit with respect to the reasons for this conclu-
sion, the opinion did stress the judge's knowledge of the contribu-
tion and the fact that it came from a joint bank account.1 32 It
should also be noted, although the court did not address this fac-
tor, that the wife in the case was employed outside the home and
therefore could be presumed to have deposited independent income
to the bank account. 33 Nevertheless, one should not assume that
every political contribution made from a joint bank account, even
when the spouse has no independent income, will necessarily be
attributed to the judge. In Briggs, the judge had engaged in other
very extensive political conduct which surely cast doubt upon the
independence of the contribution. 3 4
However, the result in Briggs does suggest that if a spouse wishes
to make political contributions, care should be taken to insulate the
judge from this activity. Nevertheless, no general rule can be
given; the resolution of'such disputes will probably be highly fact
specific, depending in large part on both the financial arrangements
between the spouses and the history of political activities by both
the husband and wife. Extensive political activity on the part of
the judge may cast doubt on a purportedly independent contribu-
tion made by the spouse. On the other hand, when a spouse has a
history of independent political activity, it seems less likely that he
or she would be viewed as a mere conduit for an improper judicial
contribution.
VI. WHO IS A CANDIDATE FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE?
Under Canon 7 of the Illinois Code, judicial candidates (includ-
ing incumbent judges) have a great deal more freedom than judges
who are not candidates to engage in political activity, both on be-
half of their own campaigns and for the benefit of others. '3 5 How-
ever, Canon 7 does not explain when an individual will be
considered a judicial candidate. It seems to be a reasonable as-
sumption that the restrictions on political activity by non-candi-
131. In re Briggs, 595 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Mo. 1980).
132. Id. at 272.
133. Id. at 272-73.
134. Id. at 270-78.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 14-32.
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date judges found in Canon 7 were enacted to further the
important policy goals of maintaining the appearance and reality of
judicial independence and impartiality. 36 Therefore, one would
expect that these restrictions were not intended to be mere formal-
istic barriers which could be easily circumvented so that judges
would be free to engage in political activity for long periods of time
prior to elections. Furthermore, given the relatively long terms of
office of Illinois judges,1 37 the need for extensive political activity
would appear to occur rather late in their tenure, at least for those
seeking retention.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that for a substantial
period of time prior to elections, judges should not have the status
of "candidate" under Canon 7, either for retention or for election
to a higher judicial office. Admittedly, these general considerations
offer little guidance to judges who would like to know precisely
when they can begin their campaigns. Furthermore, looking to the
Illinois Election Code for a definition of "candidate" can be con-
fusing because the Election Code and the Code of Judicial Conduct
do not always fit together. Moreover, as will be explained below,
there are possible interpretations of the meaning of "candidate" as
used in the Election Code that virtually nullify the restrictions on
political activity by judges in most elections.
The Illinois Election Code provides that one becomes a candi-
date when one "takes the action necessary under the laws of this
State to attempt to qualify for nomination for election, election to
or retention in public office."' 138 To qualify for the primary elec-
tion, one must file nominating petitions together with a statement
of candidacy; 3 9 a judge seeking retention need only file a "declara-
tion of candidacy."140
It is clear that the Election Code does not solve the problem of
when one becomes a candidate for judicial office in a primary elec-
tion for purposes of applying Canon 7, because subsection B(2) of
that canon provides that a "candidate" may solicit funds ninety
days before filing petitions. 4 ' Thus, the drafters apparently as-
sumed that one could be considered a "candidate" for purposes of
136. See J. SHAMAN, supra note 39, § 11.01, at 317-18.
137. Illinois circuit court judges serve for six years, while appellate and supreme
court judges serve for 10 years.
138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 9-1.3 (1989).
139. Id. para. 7-10.
140. Id. para. 7A-l.
141. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2).
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Canon 7 prior to the point in time when one becomes a candidate
under the Election Code by filing a petition.
Although the point when one becomes a judicial candidate in a
primary election for purposes of Canon 7 is unclear, it is clear that
funds cannot be solicited earlier than 189 days prior to the election.
This conclusion follows from two facts. First, candidates running
in primary elections cannot, according to the Election Code, file
their nominating petitions until ninety-nine days prior to the pri-
mary election. 142 Second, Canon 7B(2) prohibits solicitation of
contributions earlier than ninety days before filing these
petitions. 43
Under the Election Code, persons seeking retention presumably
are entitled to file their "declaration of candidacy" at any time af-
ter assuming office.'" Therefore, a technical argument can be
made that pursuant to Canon 7, so long as an attempt to file the
declaration is made, one could be treated as a candidate for reten-
tion during the entire six- or ten-year tenure in judicial office. Fur-
thermore, Canon 7B(2) permits solicitation of contributions ninety
days before "an official declaration of intention to be retained in
judicial office." '145 These two provisions, taken together, lead to the
odd result that a candidate for retention could begin soliciting for
his or her retention campaign ninety days before assuming his or
her first term as a judge. Under this reasoning, circuit court reten-
tion candidates would have six years and ninety days to solicit
funds for their retention bid if they declared their intention to run
for re-election immediately upon assuming office.
The Election Code also provides that one becomes a candidate
whenever funds are received or spent in furtherance of his or her
campaign by the person seeking the office or by one authorized by
that person. 4 6 Although Canon 7 places time limitations on when
a candidate may begin to solicit contributions 147 and when he or
she must cease soliciting, 148 it places no such limitation on the re-
142. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 7-12(1) (1989).
143. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2). Of course, if the candidate chooses
to file his or her petitions later than 99 days prior to the primary, the period for solicita-
tion would begin later than 189 days before the election.
144. The Election Code provides that the declaration is to be filed "on or before the
first Monday in December before the general election preceding the expiration of his term
of office." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 7A-l (1989) (emphasis added).
145. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2).
146. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 9-1.3 (1989).
147. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2).
148. Judicial candidates may not solicit funds later than 90 days from the last elec-
tion in which the candidate participated. Id. This provision is consistent with the Model
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ceipt or expenditure of campaign funds. 4 9 Thus, arguably, under
the Illinois Election Code, an individual might become a candidate
for judicial office by accepting unsolicited contributions or spend-
ing funds in furtherance of the campaign. Presumably, this could
occur at any time. However, this approach to establishing the sta-
tus of a "candidate" seems to create a "Catch 22." In order to
become a candidate so that one could, under Canon 7A(2), partici-
pate in political activity, one would have to engage in the "political
activity" of accepting contributions or spending funds for the
campaign. 15 0
Attempting to fit the Illinois Election Code and Canon 7 to-
gether in order to determine when one becomes a "judicial candi-
date" is at best confusing. Although receiving unsolicited
campaign funds or spending funds in furtherance of the campaign
probably would not work for the reasons just stated, Canon 7
seems to assume that one could be a candidate for the primary
before filing nominating petitions.15 1 Therefore, one might argue
that one becomes a candidate whenever a public announcement is
made. 152 With respect to those seeking retention, arguably, one
could become a candidate at any time merely by filing a declaration
of candidacy.' 153 It is not at all clear, however, that this technical
reading of the Election Code and Canon 7 is the appropriate way
to ascertain who has the status of a "candidate" for purposes of
determining how much political activity is permissible. It would
be rather odd if it were intended that the stringent restrictions on
political activity in Canon 7 could be circumvented so easily.154
Code. See 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C(2). Proposed revisions to the
Model Code would have prevented post-election fund raising entirely because of "the
potential for the exercise, or at least the appearance, of improper influence upon an
elected judge." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(2) commentary (Dis-
cussion Draft 1989). This change was not incorporated in the revision adopted by the
ABA in 1990. Instead, the 90-day limitation on solicitation after the election was re-
tained from the 1972 version. See 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C.
149. ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(2).
150. Id.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 138-50.
152. This position was taken by several judges at the 1990 Illinois Judicial
Conference.
153. Id.
154. The Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct specifically provides that an incumbent
judge shall be deemed to be a candidate for re-election during his or her entire tenure in
office. However, Kentucky candidates face greater restrictions on political activity than
do candidates in Illinois. An incumbent judge in Kentucky is not permitted to identify
himself as a member of a political party in any advertising or at a political gathering
except in response to a specific question. Candidates may attend political gathering, and
speak on their own behalf, but not on behalf of others. Further, Kentucky judicial candi-
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Canon 7 of the Model Code, upon which the Illinois Code
largely was modeled, has been described as a compromise "be-
tween political reality and the aim of maintaining the appearance
of judicial impartiality."'155 Until Illinois law is clarified on the is-
sue of when one becomes a candidate for purposes of Canon 7, a
good faith attempt to maintain a reasonable balance between these
two goals would seem to be the most prudent course.
VII. CONCLUSION
The drafters of the Illinois Code were faced with the need to
balance considerations of practical politics against the appearance
and reality of judicial independence in every one of the provisions
of Canon 7. Whether they have struck the balance by permitting
too much, too little, or just the right amount of political activity is
clearly a question that arouses spirited debate. 5 6 The preference of
some for the usually more restrictive approach of the Model Code
dates may not make political contributions or pay assessments, and fund raising is limited
to 120 days before the election. KENTUCKY CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983).
155. E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 96
(1973). The Model Code resolves the problems discussed in this Section of the Article,
very explicitly, by providing that a candidate's committee may not solicit contributions
and public support earlier than one year before the primary election. 1990 MODEL
CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C(2). The 1972 version had a much shorter time limit on
the beginning of solicitation of contributions (90 days before the primary), but made no
reference to a time limit on solicitation of public support. 1972 MODEL CODE, supra note
39, Canon 7B(2).
The 1972 version had an even more restrictive rule for retention candidates. It pro-
vided that "(a]n incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election to
office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has drawn active opposition,
may campaign in response thereto and may obtain publicly stated support and campaign
funds in the manner provided in subsection B(2)." Id. Canon 7B(3). The 1990 Model
Code deleted this restriction, so that presumably retention candidates may, like first-time
candidates, solicit public support and contributions one year prior to the election, regard-
less of whether they have opposition. 1990 MODEL CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5C(2).
Despite the relaxation of time limitations in the 1990 Model Code, the one-year period
is still much shorter than the period that the confusing Illinois rule seems to permit.
Furthermore, the Model Code contains much more stringent limitations than the Illinois
Code on the campaign activities in which judicial candidates may engage during these
periods. For instance, judicial candidates may not, under the Model Code, contribute to
other candidates, speak on behalf of other candidates, or endorse non-judicial candidates.
Id. Canon 5C. Further, the Model Code prohibits judicial candidates from making
speeches for political organizations or paying an assessment to a political organization or
candidate. Id. Canon 5A. The Illinois Code can be interpreted to permit these activities.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-42.
156. The author reached this conclusion while listening to the comments of judges
participating in the 1990 Illinois Judicial Conference sessions on judicial ethics.
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is viewed by others as naive and unfair, given the highly partisan
environment of Illinois politics.
However, in at least one regard, the drafters of the Model Code
would surely agree with those who argue for fewer restrictions on
political activities. The canon of the Illinois Code that addresses
limitations on the discussion of campaign issues is much more re-
strictive than its counterpart in the most recent version of the
Model Code. 5 ' Furthermore, in recent, well-reasoned opinions,
courts in other jurisdictions have found restrictions identical to
those in the Illinois Code to violate the first amendment rights of
candidates and voters. Despite the controversial nature of such a
change, the first amendment dictates that these restrictions be nar-
rowed to permit a broader range of issue discussion in judicial
campaigns.
There is at least one question upon which I believe nearly all
judges, and even academics, would agree. Canon 7 of the Illinois
Code simply does not give judicial candidates and judges sufficient
guidance regarding which activities are proscribed and which are
permitted. Therefore, Canon 7 can be a very frustrating rule for
those who must attempt to comply while functioning within the
highly charged political climate of Illinois. Those who choose to
be scrupulous in avoiding any hint of improper political activity
may find themselves at an electoral disadvantage. On the other
hand, the general nature of the prohibitions permits party leaders
and non-judicial candidates to press the judiciary for greater polit-
ical involvement than some believe is proper.
These concerns have led me to believe that Canon 7 must be
amended to explain with a great deal more specificity just what
political activity is and is not permitted. My experience as co-re-
porter for the Ethics Panel of the 1990 Illinois Judicial Conference
has reinforced my view that the vast majority of judges and judicial
candidates would be willing to comply with any reasonable restric-
tions that are clear and applicable in an even-handed manner.
Although no document can possibly provide definitive answers to
all the questions that might arise with respect to the propriety of
various political activities, hopefully, the previous pages of this Ar-
ticle have shown that the drafters of Canon 7 of the Illinois Code
can go much further in the direction of specificity. The judiciary
deserves to know by what rules they are expected to play the polit-
ical game in Illinois.
157. Compare ILLINOIS CODE, supra note 1, Canon 7B(1)(c) with 1990 MODEL
CODE, supra note 22, Canon 5A(3)(d).
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